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Pillans and Presnell: Florida's Proposed Rules of Criminal Discovery--A New Chapter in

LEGISLATION

FLORIDA'S PROPOSED RULES OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERYA NEW CHAPTER IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section 3, article V, of the Florida Constitution provides: "The
practice and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted
by the Supreme Court." In 1954, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
were adopted by the supreme court, and in 1962 the supreme court
approved the Florida Appellate Rules as revised. The subsequent
success of these rules and their beneficial effect on the practice of law
in the courts of Florida are generally conceded. Presently, however,
only two rules exist concerning criminal procedure,' and the Florida
Bar, at the request of the supreme court, has recently undertaken to
fill this gap. A subcommittee was appointed to draft proposed criminal rules for submission to the supreme court and after more than a
year of diligent work the committee has adopted a final draft that has
been approved by the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar. This
draft, which has been submitted to the supreme court for its consideration, represents a significant effort toward the eventual obtainment of complete justice and fairness in criminal proceedings.
The proposed rules contain a number of substantial innovations.
One such innovation- criminal discovery-is the subject of this
note. The proposed rules pertaining to criminal discovery are comprehensive and far-reaching and are in line with the recent trend
toward more liberalized discovery in criminal cases. They not only
fill the gaps of existing statutory and case law, but give both the defendant and the state discovery devices previously unknown. They
are an attempt to alleviate, if not eliminate, the existing inequities of
criminal procedure.
But, like all innovations of substantial significance, these proposed
discovery rules are highly controversial. It is, of course, to be expected
that defense attorneys will strive toward the obtainment of more discovery rights for criminal defendants. It is equally obvious that
prosecuting attorneys will resist most such attempts and will ask in
return for more discovery rights in their own favor. This apparent
conflict in respective interests has resulted in a compromise approach
toward criminal discovery in the proposed rules. This willingness to
compromise indicates the objectivity with which the subcommittee
approached this controversial subject.
The traditional reasons for denying criminal discovery: (1) that
it would subvert the system of criminal law; 2 (2) that it would increase

1. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1, 2 (1965).
2. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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perjured testimony;3 and (3) that it is inconsistent with the adversary
method4 have all been ably refuted by numerous commentators. 5 The
crucial question today is not whether there should be any criminal
discovery at all; that there is a place for some discovery is generally
conceded. Rather, the question is: How much discovery should there
be?" The purpose of this note is to evaluate objectively the proposed
Florida rules; to ascertain whether they go far enough or too far; and
to consider their effect on criminal justice in light of the above
arguments.
DISCOvERY RULES

7

The major procedural devices for discovery by both the prosecution and the accused are embodied in Rule 22 of Florida's proposed rules of criminal procedure. Paragraph (a) provides for discovery of statements or confessions, results or reports of physical
or mental examinations, and the defendant's recorded testimony before the grand jury. Rule 22 (b) provides for production of other documents and tangible items and paragraph (c) gives the state a reciprocal right of discovery. Paragraphs (d) and (e) concern the exchange
of lists of witnesses and Rule 22 (f) provides for discovery depositions.
In addition, Rules 20 and 21 provide for notice of the defenses of
alibi and insanity.8
3. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).

4. State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
5. See, e.g., Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U.

FLA. L. REv. 163
(1963); Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rv. 293
(1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YAi. L.J. 1149, 1172-98 (1960); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. Rav. 56 (1961); Louisell, The Theory of
Criminal Discovery and the Practiceof Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REv. 921 (1961).
6. Grady, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 827.

7. For discussion purposes, these rules will not be considered in their proper
numerical sequence.
8. As an adjunct to these discovery rules indictments and informations are
also simplified and made more meaningful by Rule 14. Section 14 (b) requires
"a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense," including the official or customary citation of the statute or other provision violated. In addition, the time and place of the commission of the offense
must be given as definitely as possible. Rule 14 (d) (1) (3). Rule 14 (n) limits the
discretion of the trial judge in granting bills of particulars, requiring that the
court shall order the prosecutor to furnish a bill of particulars when the indictment or information fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of the
offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense. Any reasonable doubt
concerning the construction of this rule is to be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Within the context of the discovery rules, a more precise accusatorial writ and more
liberal use of bills of particulars will make the defense counsel's initial task of
utilizing the discovery rules an easier one.
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Confessions: Rule 22 (a) (1)

A party preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is often
confronted with the necessity of overcoming the incriminating effects
of a statement that he has voluntarily given the government. 9 But
in accord with the common law view, it has generally been held that
an accused is not entitled, as a matter of right, to inspect his own
statements, memoranda, or confessions.1O Although Florida is one of
a minority of states that allows, by statute, the pretrial discovery of
certain tangible objects" the Florida Supreme Court held, in Williams
v. State,' 2 that the defendant's confession was not among the enumerated documents.
In 1963, the legislature rectified the situation by enacting Florida
Statutes, section 925.05, which was not only an innovation in the law
of Florida, but was one of the first formal legislative expressions in the
country giving an accused the right to inspect and copy or photograph
his own written or recorded statements or confessions whether signed
or unsigned. 13 The statements covered by this statute are those only of
a substantially verbatim nature taken contemporaneously with their
verbal utterance; and not incomplete notes or impressions of what
defendant had said. 14 The first section of Florida's proposed Rule
22 (a) is substantially the same as Florida Statutes, section 925.05.
Although the proposed Florida rule is in line with the decided
trend toward liberalization of discovery procedures in criminal cases,
many states still adhere to the common law view and do not allow the
defendant the right to inspect his own statements or confessions. 5
The case most often cited for this position is the New Jersey case of
State v. Tune 6 in which Justice Vanderbilt expressly denounced the
practice on the ground that discovery would often lead to perjury and
the suppression of evidence. Justice Brennan, however, now on the
Supreme Court of the United States, strongly dissented. He refuted
the perjury rationale at great length, calling it an anchronistic ap9. Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements
in the Federal Courts, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1113 (1957).
10. 23 C.J.S. CriminalLaw §955 (2) (c) (1961).
11. FLA. STAT. §925.04 (1965).
12. 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
13. 1963-1964 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 269. For other state statutes
giving the defendant the right to discover his own statements or confessions see
DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 16 (1953); M4. R.P. 728 (1963); PA. R. CRIua P. 310
(1965); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-2441 (Supp. 1965).
14. 1963-1964 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 269.
15. See, e.g., Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955); State v.
Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (Ore. 1951), af'd, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
16. 13 NJ. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
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prehension. 1 7 It shocked his sense of justice that in these circumstances an accused facing a possible death sentence should be denied
inspection of his own confession."' Several years later, in State v.
9
Johnson,1
the New Jersey court seemed to accept Justice Brennan's
position. Although the court adopted an intermediate view that inspection lies within the trial court's discretion, it noted that simple
justice requires that a defendant be prepared to meet what looms as
20
the critical element of the case against him.
Other states have followed this view and have allowed discovery
when the circumstances are such that the interests of justice will be
best served by allowing the defendant before trial to have a copy of
his confession. 2' In California the absolute right of the defendant to
inspect any statement that he has made to the police now seems
settled. 22 Louisiana, in a noted case, held that discovery of the defendant's confession is a constitutional right.23 The court saw no
necessity for following the common law rule merely because other
states in the Union continue to do so and held that the refusal to produce the confession was tantamount to depriving the defendant of a
24
fair and impartial trial.
The federal courts, however, have generally refused to follow this
trend. Before the adoption in 1965 of the amendment to Rule 16,
the right of a defendant to discover his pretrial statements under the
federal rules of criminal procedure was confusing and uncertain. 25
17. Id. at 894.
18. Id. at 896.

19. 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 31S (1958).
20. Id. at 316. Since the Johnson decision the ordinary procedure in New
Jersey has been to give defendants copies of their own statements as a matter of
course and the New Jersey court has recently noted that nothing has been brought
to their attention to suggest that this has impaired 'any prosecutions or has failed
to promote justice. State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359 (1965).
21. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959); State
v. Superior Court, 106 N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (1965).
22. Louisell, Criminal Discovery, Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. Rv.

56, 74 (1961). See, e.g., Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407
(1959).
23. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
24. Id. at 285. Subsequent cases, however, have severely restricted the application of this right in Louisiana to written confessions only. See, e.g., State v. Pailet, 246 La. 483, 165 So. 2d 294 (1964).
25. Discovery of defendant's statements has been sought under both Rules 16
and 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The great weight of authority treated confessions as outside the ambit of former Rule 16, which permitted
the defendant only to inspect books, papers, documents, or other tangible objects
obtained from the defendant or other by seizure or process. Kaufman, supra note
9, at 1114. See, e.g., Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949). But cf.
United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Although some courts
have allowed inspection under Rule 17 (c), which provides that a subpoena may
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Although a majority of the federal courts held that confessions did
not fall within the scope of the federal rules, the federal courts were
not precluded from allowing inspection of a defendant's confession.
In Shores v. United States,26 the court held that under its inherent
power to administer justice in the federal courts it could permit
discovery. It noted that perhaps as a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant ought, in enlightened criminal administration, to
27
be granted the right to have a copy of his confession in any case.
This belief has been embodied in the 1965 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the advisory committee's revision of Rule 16, the defendant is apparently automatically
entitled to inspect and copy his own pretrial statements in whatever
form. 28

This rule as amended is substantially the same as that pro-

posed by Florida Rule 22 (a) (1), and both are a realization that a
fair and impartial trial includes the right of an accused to examine
one of the strongest forms of evidence that may be used against him.
Effective representation by counsel may be almost impossible in many
instances without knowledge before trial of the details of statements
made by the defendant to police officers after he was first taken into
custody. The argument that such a practice will increase perjured
testimony is not well founded. Any such fear should be alleviated in
light of the great success of the Civil Rules. 29 The possibility of perjury would seem to exist whether or not the defendant knew beforehand the specific contents of the pretrial statement. In any event the
harm that might result from allowing discovery of pretrial statements
seems small indeed in comparison with the good to be achieved therefrom in preventing an unjust conviction. 0
command the production of documents, et cetera, e.g., Fryer v. United States, 207
F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), the weight of authority is to the contrary, and the
commentators hold the view that Rule 17 (c) was not intended as a discovery device. Kaufman, note 9 supra; Note, The Scope of Criminal Discovery Against
the Government, 67 HARv. L. REv. 492 (1954); Note, The Right of an Accused to
Obtain Pre-TrialInspection of His Confession, 48 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 305 (1957).
See United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 341 U.S. 214 (1951) in which the
Supreme Court held that Rule 17 (c) is not a discovery device.
26. 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 635 (1950).
27. Id. at 844-45. The United States Supreme Court has also noted that such
may be the better practice. LeLand v. Oregon 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The broad
implications of a recent Supreme Court decision, moreover, reveal that denial of
discovery of evidence favorable to the defendant will be a violation of due process.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a) (1).
29. There is no reason or proof to substantiate the belief that the hazard of
perjury is so much greater in criminal cases than in civil ones. State v. Tune, 13
N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 894 (1953) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
30. See Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases -In Search of a Standard, 1964
DUKE L.J. 477, 507.
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GrandJury Testimony: Rule 22 (a) (3)
Traditionally, the proceedings before a grand jury have been
cloaked in a veil of secrecy; 31 and a person charged with a crime has
not been entitled, either before or at the time of trial, to the minutes
of evidence before the grand jury. 32 In Florida, this policy of grand
jury secrecy has been preserved by statute. Florida Statutes, section
905.27, prohibits persons appearing before the grand jury from disclosing the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury or
other evidence received by it, but notes three exceptions: (1) except
when required to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before
the grand jury for the purpose of ascertaining whether his testimony
is consistent with that given before the court; 33 (2) except to disclose
the testimony of a witness charged with perjury in giving his testimony; and (3) except when permitted by the court in the furtherance
of justice. The Florida Supreme Court has found only the second exception applicable to pretrial discovery of grand jury minutes and in
a recent case stated: "[E]xcept as to grand jury testimony upon
which a charge of perjury or subornation of perjury is based- an
accused in a criminal case has no right to inspect, in advance of trial,

81. The reasons for the policy of secrecy were stated by the Florida Supreme
Court in Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 861, 365 (Fla. 1959): to protect the jurors
themselves; to promote a complete freedom of disclosure; to prevent the escape
of a person indicted; to prevent the subornation of perjury; and to protect the
reputations of persons against whom no indictment is found.
82. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); State v. Rhoads, 81
Ohio St. 897, 91 N.E. 186 (1910). See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1850 (Sd ed. 1940).
88. Although this exception has been interpreted as a constitutional right,
State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1986), its use has been
curtailed by the existence of difficult procedural requirements. Before defense
counsel may obtain the grand jury testimony, he must first establish a proper
predicate or show a "particularized need" for the grand jury minutes, and this
showing must not be based on mere surmise or speculation that the witness's
testimony is inconsistent. See Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1959).
Only when this predicate has been properly established does the trial judge have
the duty of examining the grand jury testimony with a view to making a determination of its materiality before turning it over to defense counsel for his use in
cross-examination. Jackman v. State, 140 So. 2d 627 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1962). Since
defense counsel does not have access to the grand jury testimony, it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to establish a predicate that is not based on mere
speculation that the witness's testimony is inconsistent. The requirement is therefore logically difficult to support and has come under recent attack in other
courts. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 860 U.S. 895, 408 (1959)
(Brennan, J. dissenting); State v. DiModica, 40 N.J. 404, 192 A.2d 825, 829 (1963).
For an excellent discussion of the Florida cases see Note, Discovery in Criminal
Proceedings,13 U. FLA. L. REv. 242, 245 (1960).
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the grand jury testimony of the witness who will be called by the state
' '3 4
to testify against him for the purpose of preparing his defense.
It is obvious, therefore, that in Florida the defendant's right to
inspect the grand jury testimony before trial is quite limited. Despite
a recent trend toward relaxation of the secrecy rule prior to trial in a
few state courts,3

5

and the existence of several state statutes that permit

pretrial disclosure of grand jury minutes,36 the proposed Florida rule
lifts the veil of secrecy in only one instance. Rule 22 (a) (3) merely
permits the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph his own
recorded testimony before the grand jury. s7 Since Florida Statutes,
section 905.27, prohibits the disclosure of the witness's own testimony
before a grand jury, except in perjury cases, 3 8 this provision is a
slight enlargement upon the present practice. From a practical standpoint, however, it is merely an extension of Florida Statutes, section
925.05, and its parallel proposed rule,'3 which allows the defendant
to inspect his own statements or confessions.40 Obviously, the policy
that favors pretrial disclosure to a defendant of his statements to
government agents also supports pretrial disclosure of his testimony
41
before a grand jury.
Although this proposal may be of some benefit to the defendant by
enabling his counsel to properly prepare to meet any disclosure that
he made before the grand jury, it will not significantly expand his
present discovery rights. The testimony of state witnesses before the
grand jury will still be kept secret under the proposed Florida rules
and will not be available to defense counsel for use in preparing his
defense. While it may be argued that the traditional reasons for
secrecy are no longer applicable after the indictment is returned and
the accused is in custody, 42 the failure of the proposed rules to permit
34. Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361, 364 (Fla. 1959); accord, Gordon v. State,
104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958). Note, however, FLA. STAT. §902.11 (1965) allows the
defendant to secure a copy of the transcript of all testimony taken at the preliminary hearing, but only if it is reduced to writing at the prosecutor's request.
Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). This provision has been incorporated
in the proposed rules. See Rule 12(K).
35. E.g., State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959); State v.
Clement, 40 N.J. 139, 190 A.2d 867 (1963); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d
186 (1959).
36. CAL. PEN. CODE §938.1; IOWA CODE ANN. §772.4 (1950); Ky. R. CRIM. P.
5.16; MINN. STAT. ANN. §628.04 (1947).
37. This is the same as the 1965 amendment to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16 (a) (3).
38. 1957-1958 FLA. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 523.
39. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 22 (a) (1) (final draft 1966).
40. See Committee Note, FLA. R. CRIs. P. 22 (a) (3) (final draft 1966).
41. See Advisory Committee's note, 1964 proposed amendments, FED. R. CIuM.
P. 16 (a) (3). 34 F.R.D. 411 (1964).
42. See Seltzer, Pre-Trial Discovery of Grand Jury Testimony in Criminal
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pretrial discovery of grand jury testimony probably will not result
in hardship or injustice to the defendant because the rules provide
other means by which the accused can learn of the substance of the
testimony that will be presented at trial. 43 Thus, within the total context of the discovery rules, the necessity of securing the grand jury
testimony for the purpose of preparing a defense will be greatly reduced.
Tangible and DocumentaryEvidence: Rules 22 (a) (2) and (b)
In many cases, the most damaging evidence against a defendant
may be the fingerprints, ballistics tests, FBI reports, and other tangible
documentary or scientific evidence in possession of the state. Even if
these reports may not be admissible at trial, their results often prove
innocence as well as guilt and for that reason may be quite vital to
44
the defendant in preparing his defense.
At common law, the accused was conceded no right to inspect
chattels or documents in the control of the prosecution. 45 Although
several states still adhere to the common law view,46 there has been a
growing tendency for courts to allow discovery of scientific reports
and other documentary. evidence.47 Some courts have held that the
trial court has a residuum of inherent power to order production and
inspection of such evidence, despite the absence of any statutory
authority. 48 Some states have provided by statute for the discovery
of tangible evidence; 49 and two of the states, which formerly adhered
Cases, 66 DicK. L. R-v. 379 (1962); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable
Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668 (1962).
43. See discussion of Rule 22 (f) in text following subheading Depositions:

Rule 22 (f).
44. Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and
ImpartialJustice, 42 NaB. L. Rav. 127, 131 (1962).
45. See 6 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§1859(g), 1863 (3d ed. 1940).

46. E.g., Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952); Parker v. State
164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957).
47. In several cases courts have pointed out the inapplicability of the perjury
argument in regard to discovery of tangible objects, since such evidence is not
subject to tampering or to refutation by perjury. E.g., State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 500,
206 A.2d 359 (1964); People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 255, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1960).
48. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 90 Ariz. 133, 367 P.2d 6 (1961); Norton
v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (4th D.C.A. 1959); State v.

Winsett, 200 A.2d 237 (Super. Ct. Del. 1964); State v. Superior Court, 106 N.H. 228,
208 A.2d 832 (1965); State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359 (1964); People v.
Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960); In re Di Joseph's
Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958); State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100,
338 P.2d 319 (1959).
49. Amz. R. Cium. P. 195 (1956); DEm. SuPER. Cr. (CraM.) R. 16 (1953);
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to the strict common law view,5° have recently enacted legislation
granting the defendant a limited right of discovery. 51
In the federal courts, criminal discovery is generally governed by
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior to 1965,
the federal courts imposed severe restrictions on the application of
this rule52 and discovery under the rule was allowed only in isolated
cases. 5 3 Although Rule 16 was substantially amended in 1965, the
limited effectiveness of the former rule as a discovery device is significant in state practice since most of the state statutes permitting
discovery are based on it. 54 The inadequacy inherent in the former
federal rule is thus present in the state statutes as well.
Under the 1965 amendment to federal Rule 16, discovery is no
longer limited to items obtained from or belonging to the defendant
or obtained from others by seizure or process. 55 This will remedy the
restrictive influence of the former rule in the federal courts and will
expand the defendant's right to discover books, papers, documents,
or tangible objects in possession of the Government. The amendment is significant because the federal courts have had extensive experience with discovery in criminal cases; therefore, a recommendation of expansion can only be taken as an expression of confidence in
the practical utility and soundness of the procedure.5 6 Evidence of
this view may be found on the state level as well. In a recent Dela§R 19-1530 (Supp. 1961); MD. R.P. 728 (1963); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §6727 (Supp. 1965).
50. Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955); Freeman v. State,
166 Tex. Crim. 626, 317 S.W.2d 726 (Crim. App. 1958).
51. Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.22 (1963); TEx. CODE CRIM. P. art 39.14, Vernon's Tex.
Session Law Service pamphlet No. 7 (1966).
52. Prior to 1965, Rule 16 provided that the court may order the Government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents, or other tangible objects obtained from or belonging to the
defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process upon a showing that
the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the
request is reasonable.
53. The restrictive interpretation of Rule 16 generally stemmed from the
phrase, "obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others
by seizure or process." Under this interpretation it has been held that confessions,
F.B.I. reports, grand jury proceedings, et cetera were not discoverable under this
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946). Use of Rule
16 as a discovery device was therefore limited; and it has even been suggested
that the rule was not designed to facilitate discovery of documents crucial to the
preparation of a defense, but rather to protect the property right of the defendant
in objects belonging to him. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228, 234 (1964).
54. See statutes cited note 49 supra.
55. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (b).
56. Bradshaw, Discovery in Criminal Cases: the Problem in Texas, 1 Hous.
L. REV. 158, 165 (1963).
IDAHO CODE ANN.
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ware case 57 the court refused to follow the restrictive interpretation of
its rule, which is similar to the former federal Rule 16. The court instead adopted, as a better procedure, the substance of the amended
rule as then proposed by the federal advisory committee.
Florida has a unique statute that permits more liberal discovery of
tangible evidence than the former federal rule and similar state
statutes. Florida Statutes, section 925.04,58 provides that the court may
order the state to permit the defendant to inspect designated papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or other tangible things.
It also provides that the defendant shall be permitted to be present
or have present an expert of his own selection during the course of any
examination conducted by representatives of the state as to ballistics,
fingerprints, blood, semen, and other stains.
At first blush, this statute seems to be very comprehensive, but
judicial interpretation has been to the contrary. 59 In the first case
to arise under the statute the court denied the defendant the right
to inspect his own confession.60 Subsequent cases have reinforced
this restrictive interpretation and have limited the items discoverable
thereunder.8 ' Thus, although obtaining the statements of prospective state witnesses before trial may be essential to preparation of the
defendant's case, the Florida courts have denied such discovery under
the statute on the ground that it would be an invasion of the prosecuting attorney's "work-product." 62 Similarly, secret tape recordings
taken by the prosecutor have been deemed not discoverable on the
same rationale.63
57.
58.

State v. Winsett, 200 A.2d 237 (Super. Ct. Del. 1964).
Formerly FLA. STAT. §909.18 (1961).

59. For excellent discussions of this statute, see Datz, Discovery in Criminal
Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163 (1963); Note, Discovery in Criminal Proceedings,

13 U. F1.A. L. REv. 242 (1960).
60. Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
61. But see State v. Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965) in which the
court upheld the trial court's order requiring the state to submit for inspection
and copying by the defendant all documents and legal papers that the state
intended to use at trial.
62. Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1958); McAden v. State, 155 Fla.
523, 21 So. 2d 33 (1945); Jackman v. State, 140 So. 2d 627 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962);
Bedami v. State, 112 So. 2d 284 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). But cf. Smith v. State, 95
So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1957). See also State v. Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1957). For a good discussion of this problem in Florida, see Note, Defendant's
Right To Inspect Written Statements of Prosecution Witnesses, 11 U. FLA. L. Rlv.
107 (1958). Very few states authorize a defendant to inspect the statements of
prosecution witnesses. California, however, has abrogated the rule. See, e.g.,
Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959). The federal
position in this regard is governed by 28 U.S.C. §3500 (1957), which provides that
no statement shall be the subject of discovery until the witness has testified on
direct examination.
63. Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
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Although the defendant or an expert of his choice are permitted
to be present during the course of any examination conducted by
the state, this right to be present may be meaningless since these experiments or examinations are often conducted before the defendant
is represented by counsel. Furthermore, it has been held under the
statute that reports of such examinations may not be inspected by the
defendant in advance of trial. 4 Thus, defendant will in effect often
be denied any right to ascertain the nature of such evidence before
trial.
The proposed Florida rules would significantly expand the scope
of pretrial discovery of tangible evidence and would eliminate the
inadequacies of the present statute and the restrictive interpretation
placed upon it by the courts. Proposed Rule 22 (a) (2) would permit
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph results and reports
of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the case. 65 Under this rule, the defendant would no longer be precluded from ascertaining the nature
of experiments and examinations conducted by the state merely because he or an expert of his choice was not present at the time. The
FBI ballistics report held nondiscoverable in a recent case, 68 and the
drunkometer report, which the attorney general held to be without
the scope of the present statute,6 7 would now be produced for defendant's inspection. Fingerprints and handwriting comparisons
would also be subject to discovery under this proposal. 68 Since such
items often loom large in the determination of guilt or innocence, and
are generally beyond the investigative resources of the defendant,
adoption of this proposal would help remedy a present injustice in
Florida law.
Proposed Rule 22 (b) is essentially a restatement of Florida Statutes,
section 925.04, but two changes have been effected that may broaden
defendant's present discovery rights:
(1) the phrase "the court may order" production has been
changed to, "the court shall order" production. (Emphasis added.)
Since the Florida court had previously held that the allowance of
discovery was a matter of trial court discretion,6 9 this will clarify
64. Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956). The attorney general has also
held that a drunkometer report is not discoverable under the statute. 1957-1958
FLA. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 83.
65. This provision is substantially the same as FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a) (2) (as
amended 1965).
66. Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956).
67. 1957-1958 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 83.
68. See Advisory Committee's Note, 1964 proposed amendments, FED. R. CRIM.

P. 16 (a) (2). 34 F.R.D. 411 (1964).
69. Padgett v. State, 16 Fla. 389, 59 So. 946 (1912).
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the fact that discovery of such documentary items and tangible
objects is an absolute right.
(2) To the phrase "other tangible things" in the existing
statute has been added the words, "of whatsoever kind or nature."
Although this addition may expand the defendant's right to discover such evidence, the extent of such expansion is a matter of
speculation.
If the courts continue to adhere to the "work-product" rationale,
statements of prosecution witnesses, tape recordings, et cetera, would
probably still be excluded from discovery under the proposed rule.
Possibly the grand jury transcript could be reached under this provision for inspection before trial, but this is unlikely because the rules
notably exclude such a right. Although these items may be important
to proper preparation of the defendant's case, their exclusion from
discovery in the proposed rules would probably not work a grave
injustice in light of the other discovery devices available. The defendant's need for such items, for example, is greatly reduced by his
ability to take the deposition of prosecution witnesses as provided in
Rule 22 (f). Thus, although Rule 22 (b) falls short of providing complete discovery, it seems quite adequate to meet the needs of the
defendant and the ends of justice.
ReciprocalDiscovery: Rule 22 (c)
Proposed Rule 22 (c) provides that if the court grants relief sought
by the defendant under Rules 22 (a) (2) or (b), it may condition its
order by requiring that the defendant permit the state to inspect
scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, or tangible
objects that the defendant intends to produce at trial and which
are within his possession, custody, or control7 0 This provision,
which gives the prosecution a limited right of reciprocal discovery,
affords the state an area of discovery that it previously did not have.
The right of a defendant to discovery procedures in a criminal
case has been the subject of much scholarly debate and judicial concern. Only until recently, however, has the debate extended to the
reciprocal right of the prosecutor to obtain discovery. Until a landmark California case in 1962, it had generally been taken for granted
that reciprocal rights for the prosecutor would be precluded by the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.71 But in Jones v.
Superior Court,72 the California Supreme Court rejected this reason70. This rule is substantially the same as FED. R. CRIm. P. 16 (c) (as adopted

1965).
71. See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 211, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1953) (dictum).
72. 372 P.2d 919 (1962), 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56.
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ing and opened the door to discovery by the prosecutor. The court
held, through Justice Traynor, that the prosecution was entitled to
discover the names and addresses of the witnesses whom petitioner
intended to call in support of his "affirmative defense" of impotency
and any reports and X-ray photographs the latter intended to introduce as evidence at trial.
The decision seemed to be based upon the premise that absent the
privilege against self-incrimination or other privileges provided by
law, the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying
the prosecution access to evidence that can throw light on the issues
in the case, 73 and that discovery procedure should not be a one-way
street. Accepting this premise as valid, the crucial question becomes:
Did the discovery order violate the privilege against self-incrimination?
The court was satisfied to answer this contention on the basis of the
analogous alibi statutes. This procedure, said the court, merely sets
up a wholly reasonable rule of pleading that in no manner compels a
defendant to give any evidence other than that he will voluntarily
and without compulsion give at trial. Thus, the court held that the
order did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, as it
simply required him to disclose information he would shortly reveal
74
in any event.
Although initially this rationale appears sound, there has been
much criticism of the Jones decision.7 5 While the abili statutes would
seem to justify the discovery of the names and addresses of the witnesses, they cannot justify production of the medical reports and
X-ray photographs because these statutes do not involve the production of documentary evidence. They are more of a pleading device than a method of discovery,7 6 and the holding in Jones appears to
be a repudiation of the well-established rule that the self-incrimination privilege protects all evidence, including the preexisting documents, produced through testimonial compulsion.7 7 No longer will all
chattels and documents produced in this manner be protected, but
only those the accused does not intend to introduce at the trial.78

73. Id. at 920, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 59.
74. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
228, 247 (1964).
75. See, e.g., Comment, 15 STAN. L. REV. 700 (1963); Comment, 20 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 159 (1963). But cf. Comment, 76 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1963); Comment, 8
VILL. L. REV. 110 (1962).
76. It is interesting to note that the California Legislature recently rejected a
proposed alibi statute. Thus, it may be argued that pretrial disclosure should not
be required in other instances. See Comment, 76 HARV. L. REV. 838, 842 (1963).
77. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2263, at 379 (3d ed. 1940).

78. See Comment, 51

CAL.

L. REV. 135 (1963).
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The Jones decision has been justified by some on an analysis of
the term "affirmative defense." The argument is that an affirmative
defense does not directly relate to any part of the state's case and
consequently the discovered material cannot be used by the prosecution in establishing its prima facie case. The dissenting judges in
Jones were concerned with the implications of such a position. 79 In
this case, for example, the prosecution was made aware of the defendant's intended defense because of defendant's motion for a continuance. It is unlikely, however, that the California court will allow
mere chance to define the prosecutor's right to discovery. Thus, it
can be inferred that this discovery process will be augmented by a
general interrogatory requiring the defandant to answer whether he
intends to rely upon an "affirmative defense."80 Since any defense
other than an attempt to refute the prosecution's witnesses is an
affirmative defense,"' this could mean that nearly all the information
a defendant may have accumulated before the time of trial in respect
to any "intended" defense would have to be disclosed lest it later be
ruled inadmissible when offered by the defendant as evidence.8 2 To
the dissenting judges, this was opening the door to a general inquiry
by the prosecution, which they felt would deprive the accused of his
constitutional rights.
It remains to be seen what effect the Jones decision will have on
the development of criminal discovery. Only the Washington court
has followed its lead. In State v. Grove, 3 the court upheld an order
requiring the defendant to produce a letter written by the defendant,
while in jail, to his wife explaining the circumstances of the incident
in question. The court held that the inherent power of the trial court
to grant discovery was not limited to that which benefits the defendant
and seemed to accept the fact that, on the basis of Jones, it was not
in violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
Other courts, however, may be unwilling to follow the Jones decision in light of its considerable constitutional objections. An alternative solution to the problem, which may be more acceptable
to other courts, would be to base reciprocal discovery on a waiver
theory. It has been suggested, for example, that a defendant be required as a condition of a discovery order in his favor to waive his
privilege against self-incrimination as to evidence in his hands, which
is of approximate equal probative value to that sought.8 4 Since dis79. Jones v. Superior Court, supra note 72, at 925, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65
(Peters, J. dissenting).
80. Id.
81.

Id.

82. Comment, 15 STAN. L. REv. 700, 707 (1963).
83. 398 P.2d 170 (Wash. 1965).
84. Goldstein, The State and the Accused -Balance
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covery has generally been held not to be required by due process,8 5 a
conditional grant of discovery would seem constitutionally proper.
This is the view apparently taken by the committee in proposing
Florida Rule 22 (c).
Assuming that constitutional objections may be set aside upon a
theory of waiver, the question becomes whether it is desirable to condition the defendant's access to material that will be used against him
on his willingness to surrender his constitutional rights. 86 Rule 22 (c)
is essentially an attempt at compromise, which rests upon the assumption that recognition of formal discovery rights in a defendant, without a corresponding right in the prosecution, would create an undue
procedural imbalance in the defendant's favor.8 7 Thus, such a proposal is only justifiable if, in the context of the total fact ascertainment process, the state would otherwise be unduly handicapped.
In determining whether such an imbalance exists between the state
and the accused, all the weights on the scales must be taken into
account, informal circumstances as well as formal rules s8 It must
be remembered that in the usual case, the state normally has resources,
through its investigative process, adequate to secure the information
necessary for trial. The defendant on the other hand, often represented by appointed counsel, is usually quite limited in his discovery
resources. Although the state's need for discovery procedures is
therefore generally less than defendant's, there are some situations in
which mutual disclosure would appear necessary to prevent the defendant from obtaining an unfair advantage. For example, in cases
where both prosecution and defense have employed experts to make
psychiatric examinations, it seems as important for the state to study
the opinions of experts to be called by the defendant in order to prepare for trial as it does for the defendant to study those of state's
witnesses8 9 In such a case, a conditional grant of discovery as provided

Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1198 (1960). Judicial support for this position may
be found in McCain v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (2d
D.C.A. 1960), in which the court held the defendant had waived any right he
might have had to prohibit the prosecution from making pretrial discovery against
him.

85. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959); Cicenia v.
Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1958). But cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
86. See Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate
Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 325 (1964).
87. See Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of
CriminalLaw, 14 VAND. L. REv. 921, 925 (1961).
88. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49

CAL.

L.

REv. 56, 86 (1961).

89. Advisory Committee's Note, 1964 proposed amendments, FFD. R. CRIM. P.
16 (c). 34 F.R.D. 411, 424 (1964).
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in the proposed rule would be advisable in order to prevent either
side from securing a procedural advantage. 90
Rule 22 (c) may therefore be a valuable discovery device in the
hands of the prosecution. Unfortunately, however, inherent in the
rule is a potential for abuse. If, for example, the rule is invoked as
a matter of course, this conditional right of discovery could be used as
a weapon against the defendant's own right to discovery under the
rules. A defendant seeking discovery, but faced with the necessity
of reciprocating, would often be confronted with a dilemma. In order
to secure the state's tangible evidence, the defendant would have to
permit the state to inspect any of his tangible evidence that he intends to produce at trial. Thus, if the state's evidence is obtained
under a conditional grant of discovery, the defendant, on the one
hand, would be facing the risk of providing the government with
evidence that may cure a deficiency in its case. On the other hand, if
this evidence is not provided the state, he would be precluded from
presenting this same evidence at trial even though it became important in connection with his own defense.9 1 Faced with this dilemma,
in those instances when the defendant would not choose to request
discovery, the policy of facilitating fact ascertainment through pretrial
disclosure of information pertinent to the resolution of factual issues
would be frustrated.92 In effect, this could result in the defendant
having less right to discovery under this proposed rule than the unconditional, although more limited, right that he presently has under
Florida Statutes, section 925.04.
In the final analysis, the effect of this proposed rule would
depend upon the use made of it. If a conditional grant of discovery
is made only in those cases in which the state would be unduly handicapped if denied reciprocal discovery, such a rule would be beneficial
and advisable. If, however, the rule is used indiscriminately the very
purpose of the rule would be thwarted. But, such a potential for
abuse should not condemn an otherwise valuable rule. Rather, the
burden will be on the courts to exercise sound discretion in making
conditional grants of discovery under proposed Rule 22 (c).
Notice of Defense of Alibi: Rule 20
Another reciprocal discovery device, under which the prosecutor
is the principal beneficiary, is the requirement that upon written
demand by the prosecuting attorney a defendant who intends to offer
90. See State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
91.

See Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases -In

DuKE L.J. 477, 504.
92. Comment, 61

MICH.

Search of a Standard, 1964

L. REv. 987 n.22 (1963).
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evidence of an alibi shall serve a written notice specifying the place
where he claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and
the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to
establish such alibi. 93 Fourteen states enacted alibi statutes between
the years 1927 and 1941.94 During their early years some doubt was
cast on the value of such statutes, 95 but a recent survey of prosecutors
in the states that have alibi statutes indicates their operation has been
highly successful.9 6
The purpose of requiring notice of the defense of alibi is primarily "to prevent the sudden 'popping-up' of witnesses to prove that
the defendant was not at the scene of the crime.' ' 9 7 Such witnesses are
offered after the state has put on its case-in-chief and at a time when
the prosecutor has little or no opportunity to check either the credibility of the witnesses or the accuracy of their statements. 98 Since defendants will know that their defense of alibi will be investigated
pribr to trial, a secondary effect of such a rule would be to deter the
use of false alibis. An alibi rule would also save time and money.
After the prosecutor has investigated an alibi, he will be prepared
either to meet the defense at trial and thus avoid the necessity of
seeking a continuance, or will dismiss the case because the alibi has
been substantiated. Moreover, an alibi rule should ultimately work to
93. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 20 (a) (final draft 1966).
94. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 192 (1956); INn. ANN. STAT. §§9-1631-33 (1956); IOWA
CODE ANN. §777.18 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-1341 (1949); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§28.1043-44 (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. §630.14 (1947); N.J. SUPER. & COUNTY CT.
CRIM. PRAcrICE R. 3:5-9 (1948); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. 295-L (1935); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §2945.58 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §585 (1937); S.D. CODE
§34.2801 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. §§13-6561-62
(1958); WIS. STAT. ANN. §955.07 (1958). These statutes were enacted in
response to several law review articles by Professor Millar: Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 344, 350 (1920); Millar,
The Function of Criminal Pleading, 12 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 500 (1922), and a
recommendation of the American Bar Association, A.B.A. Proceedings of the
Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting, 20 A.B.A.J. 647, 651 (1934), as well as the recommendation of several national committees and commissions, see Epstein, Advance
Notice of Alibi, 66 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 29, 30 nn.17, 18, 19 (1964).
95. Stayton, Is Specific Notice of the Defense of Alibi Desirable?, 18 TEXAS L.
REv. 151 (1940).
96. Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 29 (1964).
97. People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 216, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612, 617 (Queens
County Ct. 1936).
98. In some states, an alibi is considered an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish by a preponderance of evidence, e.g., State v. Stump, 254
Iowa 1181, 119 N.W.2d 210, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 853 (1963); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 372 Pa. 266, 93 A.2d 691, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 959 (1953), but Florida
requires that the evidence need only raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jury, Blackwell v. State, 79 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224, 15 A.L.R. 465 (1920); Knight v.
State, 60 Fla. 19, 53 So. 541 (1910).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 4
1966]

LEGISLATION

the advantage of an innocent defendant because the defense will be
more credible to the jury after a previous investigation has failed to
refute it.19 If the defendant is guilty, he should not be permitted to
go free because of perjured testimony; but if the defendant is innocent,
he should not be convicted because of the jury's skepticism of the
defense of alibi.
The principal challenge to the alibi statutes has been on the
ground that they violate the constitutional protection against selfincrimination, but no state faced with the issue has held an alibi
statute unconstitutional.10 The most thorough opinion on the
question' 01 met the self-incrimination argument by reasoning that
the requirement does not compel the defendant to give any informadon that will incriminate himself. Rather, the requirement is a
reasonable rule of pleading under which the defendant voluntarily
gives information that he plans to offer at trial.
In interpreting the statutes, the courts have been careful to preserve the rights of the defendant. If the defendant chooses not to
introduce evidence of an alibi, it should be considered reversible
error for the prosecutor to read the notice of intention to rely on an
alibi or to comment on the failure of the defendant to call alibi
'witnesses.' 02 Moreover, the requirement does not operate to shift the
burden of proof, and the prosecutor still must offer evidence placing
the defendant at the scene of the crime. 0 3 If the defendant fails to
give the proper notice under the proposed rule, the court may exclude
evidence offered to prove the defense. 04 This should not raise an
issue of due process because within the constitutional framework
criminal procedure is not limited to that which was known at common law. 05 New procedure may be developed and, provided it is
not arbitrary, 00 the exclusion of the defendant's evidence for failure
99. See State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937). But see People v.
Wudarski, 253 Mich. 83, 234 N.W. 157 (1931) which permitted the trial judge to
disparage alibi testimony despite notice of the defense.
100. People v. Marcus, 253 Mich. 410, 235 N.W. 202 (1931) (constitutionality
implied); People v. Wudarski, 253 Mich. 83, 234 N.W. 157 (1931) (constitutionality
implied); People v. Shulenburg, 279 App. Div. 1115, 112 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct.
1952); People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612 (Queen's County Ct.
1936); State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495, 30 A.L.R. 2d 476 (1952).
101. People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612 (Queen's County Ct.
1936).
102. People v. Mancini, 6 N.Y.2d 853, 188 N.Y.S.2d 559, 160 N.E.2d 91 (1959);
State v. Cocco, 73 Ohio App. 182, 55 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
103. State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 119 N.W.2d 210, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 853
(1963).
104. FLA. R. CaRm. P. 20 (a) (final draft 1966).
105. E.g., Hurtado v. California 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
106. E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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to follow the procedure is not a denial of due process. 10 7 One other
question, which has a bearing on the constitutionality of the rule, is
whether the defendant himself may be denied the opportunity to give
alibi testimony. The proposed rule assures this right to the defendant
by specifically providing that the defendant's own testimony cannot
be excluded for failure to give notice of an alibi defense. New
York has reached the same result by judicial decision,108 while Ohio
has decided otherwise on the grounds that the defendant has no
constitutional right to testify and it is a matter of discretion with the
legislature.109

Under the proposed rule the prosecuting attorney must initiate
the process by making a written demand for notice of the defense. 110
This requirement is based upon the assumption that in most instances the prosecutor can anticipate an alibi defense, 11 and the rule
can be justified as a reasonable means of calling the notice requirement to the attention of the defendant. Opponents suggest that by
making the demand, the state is inviting the defense,'1 12 but such an
argument is misplaced when it is considered that one of the primary
effects of the rule is to eliminate false alibi defenses.
One of the more controversial aspects of the proposed rule is the
requirement that the defendant provide names and addresses of the
witnesses by whom he proposes to establish the alibi. 113 Such a requirement facilitates the investigation of the prosecuting attorney
and, from his point of view is highly desirable. On the other hand,
107. See People v. La Crosse, 5 Cal. App. 2d 696, 43 P.2d 596 (Ist D.C.A.
1935) in which this reasoning was applied to reject a due process challenge to a
notice of defense of insanity statute. The requirements of the statute might be
considered a rule for the introduction of evidence, Woods v. State, 233 Ind. 320,
119 N.E.2d 558 (1954), or that the issue was of relevancy on the grounds that if
there is no notice, alibi is not an issue in the case, State v. Rourick, 245 Iowa
319, 60 N.W.2d 529 (1953).
108. People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd,
289 N.Y. 306, 45 N.E.2d 812 (1942).
109. Smetana v. State, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 165 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 131 Ohio St. 329, 2 N.E.2d 778 (1936).
110. Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York also require a demand by the
prosecutor. See statutes cited note 94 supra.
111. In State v. Wiedenmayer, 128 N.J.L. 239, 25 A.2d 210 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1942), New Jersey held the failure of the prosecutor to make the demand relieves
the defendant of the obligation of providing notice.
112. For a discussion of the competing arguments, see Epstein, supra note 96,
at 34.
113. Seven of the fourteen states have the requirement: Arizona, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin. Iowa requires the defendant to
list not only names and addresses of the witnesses but also their occupation and a
statement of what the defendant expects to prove by the testimony of each
witness. See statutes cited note 94 supra.
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the absence of such a provision has not seriously impaired the effectiveness of the alibi statutes. 114 This provision was the primary
reason the Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure" 5 and the California Bar Association"6 have refused to
support an alibi rule. Their fear is that such notice would operate
to discourage and intimidate prospective alibi witnesses and thereby
injure the defendant's legitimate alibi defense.217 To ameliorate the
possible unfairness of requiring the defendant to provide a list of his
alibi witnesses, the proposed rules permit the defendant to demand a
list of witnesses by whom the prosecutor intends to place the defendant at the scene of the crime." 8 In its practical effect, however,
this provision offers little more to the defendant than that which he
could obtain under Proposed Rule 22 (e): Exchange of Witness Lists.
The sanction by which the proposed rule is enforced is the discretionary power of the trial judge to exclude the defendant's evidence, other than the testimony of the defendant himself." 9 This
sanction, however, may cut both ways as there is authority to the
effect that if the prosecutor fails to provide the defendant with a list
of his witnesses the trial judge has authority to exclude the state's
evidence placing the defendant at the scene of the crime. 20 All other
states with an alibi statute utilize this type of sanction with the exception of Oklahoma and Iowa, which mer'ely require that a continuance be granted when proper notice is not given. The proposed
rule also provides that for good cause shown, the court may waive
the requirements of the rule. This makes the rule sufficiently flexible
in the event of an exceptional case; although, to date there has been
no reported case in which a trial judge has been reversed for improperly excluding alibi testimony. In fact, the courts have been
strict in interpreting the statutes. The requirement of notice has
been characterized as "mandatory" in Ohio,21 and oral notice has in
114. Epstein, supra note 96, at 34.
115. See Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases -In
DUKE LJ. 477, 498.

116. 36

CAL. STATE

Search of a Standard, 1964

B.J. 480, 487 (1961).

117. Everett, supra note 115, at 498.
118. This is patterned after N.J. SUPER. & COUNTY CT. CRIM. PRACTIcE R.
3:5-9 (1948).
119. See, e.g., Lamar v. State, 195 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1964); People v. McFadden,
347 Mich. 357, 79 N.W.2d 869 (1956); People v. Wright, 172 Miss. 860, 16 N.Y.S.2d
(Columbia County Ct. 1940); State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 5 Ohio Op. 2d 87,

149 N.E.2d 583 (1957).
120. Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d 362 (1954). This ruling was

based on the express language of the Indiana statute, but the sanction should be
read into the Florida rule.
121. State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 5 Ohio Op. 2d 87, 149 N.E.2d 583

(1957).
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no case been considered sufficient. 122 Once a defendant has given

the notice, he may be bound by the facts recited in the notice,123
and he cannot evade the rule by labeling "alibi" testimony as testi1 24
mony to contradict or impeach the state's witnesses.
The proposed rule requires that in his written demand, the
prosecutor must "specify as particularly as is known . . . the place,

date, and time of the commission of the crime.' 2 5 The information
contained in the written notice would probably in most instances,
obviate the need for a bill of particulars. However, if the notice is
insufficient, there should be no question but that the defendant is
entitled to one if a question arises as to the exact time and place of
2
the offense.1 6

The alibi rule can be an effective device to reduce use of false
alibis. The rule is primarily for benefit of the prosecutor, but in
light of the other liberal discovery procedures given the defendant
under the proposed rules, this rule is a reasonable means of assuring
that both sides will be fully prepared at trial.
Notice of Defense of Insanity:Rule 21
Rule 21 of the proposed rules incorporates almost verbatim the
present Florida law requiring the defendant or his counsel to give
notice that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant
is insane or that he intends to rely upon the defense of insanity.127
If the defendant claims he is incapable of standing trial, the court
must order a hearing at which experts, who have been appointed
by the court to examine the defendant, can be called to testify as to
the defendant's mental condition. 12

If the defendant intends to claim

insanity as a defense, he must submit a bill of particulars showing
as nearly as possible the nature of the insanity he expects to prove and
the names of witnesses by whom he expects to prove such insanity.29
Following the notice, the court may appoint disinterested qualified
experts to examine the defendant and these examining experts must
be summoned to testify at the trial.130 The rule does not preclude the
122. Balzliser v. State, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 666 (Ct. App. 1931); State v. Selbach,
268 Wis. 538, 68 N.W.2d 37 (1955).
123. State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495, 30 A.L.R. 2d 476 (1952).
124. State v. Nooks, 123 Ohio St. 190, 174 N.E. 743 (1930).
125. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 20 (final draft 1966).
126. Proposed Rule 14 gives the trial judge little discretion in granting bills
of particulars. See discussion note 8 supra.
127. FLA. STAT. § §909.17, 917.01, .02 (1965).
128. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 21 (a) (final draft 1966).
129. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 21 (b) (final draft 1966).
130. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 21 (c)(final draft 1966).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 4
LEGISLATION

1966]

state or the defense from calling other expert witnesses to testify and,
for good cause shown, the court has the discretion to permit introduction of such testimony despite failure of the defendant to comply
with the notice and procedure. 131
The proposed rule makes no specific provision for enforcement
when the defendant fails to give notice or refuses to submit to a
psychiatric examination. However, in light of the provision that
allows the judge to waive the requirements and permits introduction
of evidence, the proposal apparently contemplates that the judge
defendant
should exclude proffered psychiatric testimony when the
132
has, without good cause, failed to comply with the rule.
This discovery device has found wide acceptance; at least thirty
states and the District of Columbia require the defendant to submit
to a mental examination when the issue of his mental condition is
raised. 1 33 These insanity statutes have been enacted to balance the
interest of the state and the accused. 3 4 The value of the procedure to
the state is obvious. While lay witness's testimony as to the defendant's mental condition is admissible in Florida,"35 expert testimony,
based upon examination of the accused, is the normal procedure and
is the most persuasive in the minds of the jury. 36 In the absence of
a rule or statute requiring notice and an examination, the defendant
37
could create a reasonable doubt of his sanity" by calling his own

expert witnesses and could then make this plea invulnerable by preventing all inquiry into his mental condition on the part of the
38

state.1

These statutes also work to the advantage of a defendant by assuring him a hearing on his mental capacity to stand trial. They
also insure that expert testimony will be available to an indigent defendant who would otherwise be unable to afford the testimony of a
9
psychiatrist or psychologist."3
Constitutional attacks on the insanity statutes have generally been
unsuccessful. The principal challenge has been on the ground that
the statutes violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination,
131. Ibid.
132. There is no Florida case that has considered this issue under FLA. STAT.
§909.17 (1965).
133. For an excellent discussion of the state statutes, see State v. Whitlow,
45 N.J. 3, 11, 210 A.2d 763, 767 n.1 (1965).
134. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
135. Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892).
136. See generally Note, Why Not Bury M'Naghten's Moldy Ghost?, 12 U.
FA. L. REv. 184, 186 (1959).
137. Johnson v. State, 57 Fla. 18, 49 So. 40 (1909).
138. See State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 Pac. 597 (1922).
139. See Gentilli v. Wainwright, 157 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1963); Hobbs v. Cochran,
143 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1962).
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but this argument is usually rejected on the rationale that the requirement is not compulsory, that the defendant has waived his privilege
against self-incrimination, or that the evidence is not in itself incriminating.140 Yet, the issue is not entirely free from doubt as several
recent cases have held that the right against self-incrimination prohibits a compulsory psychiatric interview with the defendant.141 The
courts faced with the issue, however, recognize the value of the insanity statutes 142 and, within the reciprocal discovery philosophy of
143
the proposed rules, the notice of insanity rule should be sustained.
Proposed Rule 21 adds nothing new to the Florida law, but it does
carry forward an essential discovery device, which can operate to the
benefit of the defendant as well as to the state.
List of Witnesses: Rules 22 (d) and (e)
An additional form of reciprocal discovery, set forth in Rules 22 (d)
and (e), gives the defendant optional procedures for obtaining a list
list of the prosecution witnesses. Although at common law an accused
had no right to obtain a list of the state's witnesses prior to trial'144
nearly every jurisdiction provides by statute for such discovery. 145
The general purpose of these statutes is to safeguard the accused
against surprise and unfair advantage by the prosecuting attorney. 46
Traditional notions of a fair trial include the right of a defendant to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation and to confront the

140.

See generally Annot. 32 A.L.R.2d 434 (1953) and McVeigh v. State, 73

So. 2d 694 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 885 (1954).
141. French v. District Ct., 384 P.2d 268 (Colo. 1963); cf. People v. English,
31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964). For a full discussion of the question see
Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examinations? Privilege Against Self
Incrimination, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 489 (1965).

142. See State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
143. See People v. La Crosse, 5 Cal. App. 2d 696, 43 P.2d 596 (1935); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
144. Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792); Baker v. State, 51 Fla. I,
40 So. 673 (1906).
145. These statutes fall into three general classes: (1) those that require a list
of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, e.g., OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 22,
§384 (1937); PA. R. CRIM. P. 216 (1965); (2) those that require a list of the
witnesses known to the prosecuting attorney, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.980 (Supp.
1965), MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §94-6208 (1947), (these statutes are especially appropriate to a prosecution upon information when there is no grand jury indictment and often coexist with (1) above, e.g., KY. R. CRIM. P. 608 (1963)); and (3)
those that require a list of all witnesses intended to be produced by the state,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §769.4 (1950), MD. ANN. CODE, Rules of Procedure 728 (1963).
146. See, e.g., State v. Williford, 64 Wash. 2d 787, 394 P.2d 371 (1964); People
v. Weisberg, 396 Ill. 412, 71 N.E.2d 671 (1947).
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witness against him. 147 Since these rights could be made ineffective
if the state can conceal the names of its witnesses until the day of
the trial,1 48 an accused is entitled not only to be confronted with the
witnesses in court, but he is entitled to some opportunity to know who
is to testify against him. 49 The Florida statute, 50 enacted in 1939
was a recognition of this fact.
Although the law in Florida was inconsistent on this point before
adoption of Florida Statutes, section 906.29,15' it had been recognized
that the prosecuting attorney was required as a matter of duty to
place upon the back of the indictment the names of the witnesses
who testified before the grand jury and upon whose testimony the
indictment was found.1 5 2 The Florida statute was a codification of this
view. It provides that upon motion of the defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to furnish the names, of witnesses on
whose evidence the indictment or information was based. This does
not, however, require a trial judge to order the state to furnish a
53
full and complete list of witnesses to be used by the state.
Proposed Rule 22 (d) is simply a restatement of Florida Statutes,
section 906.29, except for addition of the requirement that the addresses of the witnesses be given. The defendant is allowed this procedure in any event.154 Rule 22 (e), however, affords the defendant
the additional practice of obtaining a list of all the state's witnesses,
as distinguished from merely those on whose evidence the information or indictment is based. But this right is conditioned upon the
defendant's willingness to give the state a list of all his witnesses,
which therefore makes this provision a form of reciprocal discovery.
The defendant initiates the process by filing a written offer to furnish
the prosecution a list of all witnesses he expects to call at trial. After
the defendant's offer, the prosecutor must furnish the defendant with
a list of all witnesses known to him to have information that may be
relevant to the offense charged. The defendant must then reciprocate by furnishing his list of witnesses. There should be no constitu147. FLA. CONST., Deci. of Rights §11. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964)
the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment guarantee of
the rights of an accused to confront the witnesses against him was a fundamental
right obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment.
148. State v. District Court of First Judicial Dist., 124 Mont. 249, 220 P.2d

1035, 1042 (1950).
149.

8 ALI PROC

INGS 134 (1930).

150. FLA. STAT. §906.29 (1965).
151. Compare Murray v. State, 25 Fla. 528 (1889), with Padgett v. State, 64
Fla. 389, 59 So. 946 (1912). See Comment, 7 U. FLA. L. Rav. 113 (1954).
152. Lee v. State, 115 Fla. 30, 37, 155 So. 123, 126 (1934).
153. EzzeU v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956); Shields v. State, 64 So. 2d 271
(Fla. 1953). Cf. State v. Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
154. Committee Note, FLA. R. CIuM. P. 22 (d), (e) (final draft 1966).
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tional objection to this procedure since the defendant by starting
the process may be deemed to have waived his privilege against selfincrimination.
Only one jurisdiction has a statute similar to the proposed Florida
rule. Under the Washington Code, each of the parties to a criminal
action is required to provide his adversary with a list of witnesses
who will be called at trial, regardless of the character of the defense.15
This statute thus provides for a reciprocal exchange, but production
of the prosecutor's list is not conditioned upon the defendant first
offering to produce his list, as provided by the Florida rule. Although
its constitutionality has been upheld, 15 6 the statute has been of questionable value. The cases interpreting the statute indicate that the
Washington courts have been very liberal in sustaining the action of
trial courts in permitting the state to use witnesses whose names have
1
not been furnished to a defendant. 5
In light of the Washington experience, it is obvious that in order
to be effective this procedure must be coupled with a sufficient sanction against noncompliance. Proposed Rule 22 (g) provides such a
sanction. If a party fails to comply with the rules, or with an order
issued pursuant to the rules, the court may order the defaulting party
to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously
disclosed, grant a continuance, prohibit the party from introducing
into evidence the material not disclosed, or enter such other order
as it deems just under the circumstances. This apparently gives the
court wide discretion in dealing with noncompliance. Such discretion
will permit the court to consider the reasons disclosure was not made,
the extent of the prejudice, if any to the opposing party, the feasibility
of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant
circumstances.158

Proposed Rule 22 (g) also requires that if a party discovers additional material, which he would have been under a duty to disclose or produce at the time of such previous compliance, he shall
promptly notify the other party or his attorney of existence of the
additional material. This requirement of a continuing duty to disclose is obviously necessary in order to make the preceeding discovery rules effective. Under the existing discovery statute, 5 9 it has
been held the state is not required to make available discoverable
evidence found subsequent to the discovery order, unless the de155.

156.
157.
158.
P. 16 (g).
159.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§10.37.030 (1951).

State v. Sickles, 144 Wash. 236, 257 Pac. 385 (1927).
State v. Willis, 37 Wash. 2d 274, 223 P.2d 453 (1950).
See Advisory Committee Note, 1964 proposed amendments, FMD. R. CRIa.
34 F.R.D. 411 (1964).
FLA. STAT. §925.04 (1965).
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fendant files another motion for that purpose. 160 Under the proposed rules, however, if either attorney learns of additional witnesses
who may have information relevant to the case, or any other discoverable evidence previously sought, he must make these available.
If he knowingly fails to comply with this provision, the court would
be justified in excluding such evidence.
While the requirement that the prosecutor submit a list of witnesses is mandatory if the defendant first offers to do the same, it is
not an absolute requirement. The prosecuting attorney may, prior
to filing his list of witnesses, move the court for a protective order
as provided in subsection (h) of Rule 22. Such an order may be
necessary, for example, in order to protect the identity of a confidential
informant. This rule would not affect the present case law, which
allows identity of an informer to be concealed on grounds of public
policy unless such disclosure is material to the issue or necessary to
meet the ends of justice.16l If, however, the confidential informer is
62
to be used as a witness his identity must be disclosed.1
This list of witnesses' requirement is obviously a valuable discovery
device for both the state and the accused. The defendant maintains
his existing right to discover the witnesses upon whom the indictment
or information is based.163 In addition, if he is willing to reciprocate,
the defendant has opportunity to discover the names of all relevant
witnesses. This procedure would have the beneficial effect of eliminating surprise on either side and would allow the state a method of
discovery, which it previously did not have. Since the defendant
would have the right to obtain a list of essential witnesses in any
event, the conditional right to secure all the prosecution's witnesses
could not be effectively used as a weapon against his own discovery
rights. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, this rule is necessary
in order to effectuate the other proposed rules. The right to take the
deposition of a witness, for example, would be of little practical
value if the identity of such witness is not known.
Depositions:Rule 22 (f)
Rule 22 (f) of the proposed rules, giving the defendant the right
to take discovery-depositions, offers the accused a means of discovery
unknown at common law 64 and almost unique among the American
160. Belger v. State, 171 So. 2d 574 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
161. See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 114 So. 2d 844 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
162. Committee Note, note 154 supra.
163. Proposed Rule 22 (d). Presently FLA. STAT. §906.27 (1965).
164. State v. Lampp, 155 So. 2d 10 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), appeal dismissed,
166 So. 2d 891. (1964).
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jurisdictions.165 The use of depositions as a means of discovering
what a witness will testify to at trial was first made generally available
in civil actions in Florida by statute in 1947166 and was carried forward into the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in 1954.167 No one
can seriously contend that the civil rules have not been an invaluable
tool in civil procedure, making all the relevant facts available to the
68
parties, and thus rendering surprise at trial practically impossible.1
Despite this experience, use of the deposition as a discovery device has
remained totally unavailable or severely limited in the criminal law.
The great majority of states, 69 and the federal courts, 70 allow
either the defendant, the prosecutor, or both a partial right to take a
deposition when it can be shown that the witness will be unavailable
at trial. The present Florida statute is typical in that it allows the
defendant the right to take depositions only when it can be shown
"that the testimony of absent persons is material and necessary . . .
and that such witnesses reside beyond the jurisdiction of the court or
are so sick and infirmed that with diligence their presence cannot
be procured.''71 In effect, these statutes cannot be considered as
discovery statutes, but are solely for the purpose of perpetuating
testimony to avoid a miscarriage of justice because of the absence of
2
a material witness.1
With the exception of this very restricted use of depositions, the
right of the defendant to talk to prosecution witnesses, much less take
their deposition in a criminal case, is highly doubtful. The Florida
Supreme Court has recognized that it is not merely a right but a
duty of defense counsel to interview the persons having knowledge
of an alleged offense17 3 and has considered it a violation of defendant's
constitutional rights for the state to refuse defense counsel access to a

165.

In 1961, Vermont passed a statute almost identical with the Proposed

Rule. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § §6721-27 (1961).

166. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 24041.
167.
168.
169.

FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.21.
Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So. 2d 341 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
See Note, Criminal Procedure: Depositions and Change of Venue, 36

TEMP. L.Q. 326, 331 nn.29, 30; 5

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§1141 (3d ed. 1940) for a list

of state criminal statutes allowing discovery.
170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
171. FLA. STAT. §916.06 (1965).
172. Kelly v. People, 121 Colo. 243, 215 P.2d 336 (1950). In State v. District
Court, 253 Iowa 903, 114 N.W.2d 317 (1962) and State v. Axelrod, 248 Minn. 204,
79 N.W.2d 667 (1956), statutes providing that a defendant in a criminal case may

examine witnesses "in the same manner and with like effect as in civil actions"
were held not to give a defendant the right to take discovery-depositions permitted

by the civil rules in those states.
173. Mathews v. State, 44 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1950).
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material witness who is confined in jail." 4 But access is the limit of
the defendant's rights, and he presently has no means of compelling
a witness to talk to him. Succintly stated: "[I]t is true that any defendant has the right to attempt to interview any witness he desires.
It is also true that any witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed, if he so desires."'175 Even when the witness is willing to talk
to the defendant, the court has discretionary power to place restrictions or conditions on the interview or prohibit the interview
altogether.176
In contrast with the very limited opportunity of the defendant
to talk to witnesses, the prosecutor, by statute in Florida, has a very
broad power to summon all witnesses, to administer oaths, and to require them to testify as to any violation of the criminal law. 1 7 These
statutes are considered remedial in nature and are liberally construed in order that the prosecutor may carry out the duties and
powers of his office.178 Since neither the defendant nor his counsel
are present when the statement is taken, the procedure raises a constitutional question concerning the defendant's right to confrontation
and cross-examination of the witnesses against him.179 Although by
implication the Florida Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of these statutes, 8 0 the rules committee alluded to this problem
by expressing their feeling that some limitation should be placed
on the state's unilateral right to take depositions. They were unable,
however, to agree on a means of altering the situation.1 8'
174. Hodgins v. State, 139 Fla. 226, 190 So. 875 (1939); accord, Bobo v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 774, 48 S.E. 213 (1948).
175. Byrnes v. United States, 327 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1964).
176. Baker v. State, 47 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1950); Nations v. State, 145 So. 2d 259
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
177. FLA. STAT. §27.04 (1965) (state attorney); FiA. STAT. §32.20 (1965) (county
solicitor).

178. Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1952) (defense witnesses); Collier v.
Baker, 155 Fla. 425, 20 So. 2d 652 (1945) (defense witness); Cooper v. Coleman, 138

Fla. 520, 189 So. 691 (1939) (applicable to assistant state attorney).
179.

In general, the statutes permitting the prosecution to take depositions

when the witness will be unavailable for trial have been held constitutional. See
Annot. 90 A.L.R. 377 (1934). But a small minority of states have indicated,
largely by dicta, that the use of depositions even in this limited circumstance would

be a violation of the defendant's right to confront the witnesses. See Kaelin v.
Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 354, 1 S.W. 595 (1886); Harrison v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky.
840, 100 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. App. Ct. 1937) (no statute authorizing depositions);

State v. Chambers, 44 La. Ann. 603, 10 So. 886 (1892); State v. Lonergan, 201 Ore.
161, 269 P.2d 491 (1954) (statute admitting deposition of imprisoned felon); State

v. Mahoney, 122 Vt. 456, 176 A.2d 747 (1961). Under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 15 (b) the Government must give notice of the taking of a deposition.
180. Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1952).
181. Committee Note, FLA. R. Cm. P. 22 (f)(final draft 1966).
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Not only has the defendant no right to take a discovery deposition
of his own, he has generally been unsuccessful in obtaining the statements of witnesses taken by the prosecutor. There is one reported case
in which the trial court has granted the defendant's pretrial motion to
inspect a witness's statement,18 2 but in all other cases the Florida
appellate courts have sustained the refusal of the trial court to permit
the defendant to inspect the statements.8 3 The rationale of these decisions is that these statements are the "work product" of the
prosecutor, and as such are not discoverable.5 4 A statement may be
obtained by the defense during the trial, however, if the prosecutor
uses it to refresh or to impeach a witness.1 5
There is an obvious imbalance in the present law, and it is to this
problem that proposed Rule 22 (f) is addressed. The rule provides
that upon motion of the accused, the court: "[S]hall order the taking
of the deposition of any person other than a confidential informer...
who may have information relevant to the offense." The defendant is
required to show "that the testimony of the witness may be material
or relevant on trial, or of assistance in preparation of his defense,
and that the witness will not cooperate in giving a voluntary, signed,
written statement to the person charged or his attorney."1 6 The
rule further provides that notices must be given the prosecuting attorney and that depositions shall be taken in the manner provided in
the Florida Rules of Civil procedure. The depositions may be used
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a
deponent as a witness.
The rule has substantial limitations in that it requires a showing
of relevancy, materiality, and lack of cooperation before a deposition
may be taken. These limitations represent a compromise between
the members of the rules committee who wanted unlimited discovery,
and those who wanted to condition the defendant's right to take a
deposition upon the waiving of his privilege against self-incrimination

182. In Drozewski v. State, 84 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1956) the trial court ordered
production of the witness's statement, but it was not error for the prosecutor to
fail to produce these statements when the defendant made no further effort to
obtain them.
183. Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1958); McAden v. State, 155 Fla.
523, 21 So. 2d 33, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 723 (1945); Bedami v. State, 112 So. 2d
284 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 883 (1959); Russom v. State, 105 So. 2d
380 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958), cert. dismissed, 109 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1959); Urga v.
State, 104 So. 2d 43 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). But cf. the dicta in State v. Smith, 95
So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1957).
184. See generally Note, Defendant's Right To Inspect Written Statements of
Prosecution Witnesses, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 107 (1958).
185. State v. Shouse, 177 So. 2d 724 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
186. Emphasis added.
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and submitting to an interrogation under oath by the prosecuting
attorney.187
The proposed deposition rule is almost identical with a 1961
Vermont statute, 88 the only difference being the Florida requirement
that the defendant show that the witness will not cooperate. In State
v. Mahoney,8 9 the Vermont Supreme Court, noting that the statute
was the first of its kind, held it constitutional and refused to give it
a narrow interpretation. It should be anticipated that similar litigation
will result in Florida, probably concerning the meaning of the phrase
"will not cooperate." The committee suggested the possibility that
a witness may say he is making himself available and yet never
actually submit himself to an interview.8 0 Additionally, a witness
may voluntarily submit to an interview and then be so evasive as to
render the session worthless. The committee recognized the difficulty
in interpreting the word "cooperate" but emphasized that it should
"be given a liberal interpretation."' 9'
To prevent abuse of the deposition privilege, proposed Rule 22 (h)
provides for protective orders whereby, upon a sufficient showing, the
court may deny, restrict, or defer the taking of a deposition. In addition, proposed Rule 22 (i) assures that the discovery procedures will
be available to all persons accused of crime by providing that: "After
a defendant is adjuged insolvent, the reasonable cost incurred in the
operation of these rules shall be taxable as cost against the county."
The committee recognized that a statute is probably needed since
there is serious doubt whether the court by a rule of procedure can
impose this additional expense on the counties. The committee felt,
however, that the provision was necessary to comply with the recent
trend of federal decisions requiring the state to pay the litigation costs
of indigents and that without this provision it is likely the rules
19 2
will either be declared void or their application will be confused.
The deposition-discovery rule greatly expands the right of the
defendant to determine prior to trial the nature of the evidence
against him. If the legislature and courts continue to allow the
prosecutor almost complete discretion in taking statements of witnesses, this proposal is highly justified in granting the defendant a
corresponding right. The proposed rule should reduce the defendant's
need for pretrial inspection of the statements of prosecution witnesses
since he will have an equal opportunity to interview them. Proposed
187. Committee Note, FLA. R. CriM. P. 22(c) (final draft 1966), alternate
proposals (1) and (2).
188. VT.STAT. ANN. fit. 13, §6721-27 (1961).
189. 122 Vt. 456, 176 A.2d 747 (1961).
190. Committee Note, FLA. R. Cium. P. 22 (f)(final draft 1966).
191. Id.
192. Committee Note, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 22 (1) (final draft 1966).
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Rule 22 (e), which provides for the exchange of witness lists,
becomes meaningful only in relation to the deposition rule. Without
some guarantee that he will have the right to talk to prosecution witnesses, the defendant would have little reason to initiate the proceedings to exchange lists.
Traditionally, the main criticism of criminal discovery has been
the argument that it will increase the incidence of perjury. However,
when depositions are taken at an early stage in the proceeding and
both sides come to trial armed with materials to refresh or impeach
the "mistaken" or "confused" witness, the likelihood of perjured testimony will be reduced. Of all the discovery provisions in the proposed
rules, the deposition rule probably represents the greatest innovation.
Yet, by its adoption, it will merely give the defendant a right coequal
with that already enjoyed by Florida prosecuting attorneys.
CONCLUSION

The proposed Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure offer the
Florida Supreme Court a unique opportunity to rethink the whole
area of criminal procedure. This area of the law has often been neglected. It lags behind developments made in civil procedure and is
saddled with historic precedents that, in light of modern experience,
have become anachronisms. No one could seriously argue but that
the ultimate purpose of any procedural rule is to guarantee a fundamentally fair trial. Logically, it would seem this purpose would dictate that criminal procedure afford a reasonable opportunity for
preparation of a defense. The absence of discovery, or limited discovery allowable at the discretion of the trial judge, however, fails
to accomplish this purpose. The only way that discovery can effectively operate is in accord with objective standards established by
rule or statute.
The proposed rules expand the discovery rights of both prosecution and defense. If adopted, they would make Florida a leader in
the area of criminal procedure. Dean Griswold of Harvard has challenged the bar and bench to take the "long view" on criminal procedure and to reexamine the problem. 193 Implicit in Dean Griswold's
challenge is that within the expanding concept of due process and
fundamental fairness, the standards of justice will improve with or
without the cooperation of the states.1 94 The Florida Bar has amply
193. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1965).
194. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Brady v. Maryland, 372 U.S. 83
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
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